Theory of
Meaning
Philosophy
135
Bence Nanay's
Sections
How to write a philosophy paper: Guidelines
Section Times:
Tuesday
Tuesday
Wednesday
This page is
NOT the official homepage of the course.
The official
home page is here.
The purpose of
this page is to provide information on the readings, section, assignments, and
post announcements for the students in my section.
If you have any questions or comments about the course, section, readings, website, etc. write me an email
Office Hours
this week:
Tuesday
12.30-1.30
Wednesday
Café Strada
(Bancroft and College)
Announcements:
The question
topic:
1. A
common objection to Quine's indeterminacy thesis is that even if a linguist
could not, on the basis of behavioral evidence, choose between a translation
manual that translates 'gavagai' as 'rabbit' and one that translates it as
'undetached rabbit part', there are further facts that would determine which
translation manual is correct. Pick one kind of fact that might be thought
to resolve the indeterminacy, and discuss whether it does. Be sure to
consider how Quine might reply to the claim that such facts resolve the
indeterminacy.
2. In “If You Can't Make One, You Don't
Know How it Works” and “The Nature of Thought,” Dretske develops an account of
thought according to which creatures without language or society can have
thoughts. How might Davidson argue against Dretske's account? (You
should be sure to look at Davidson's article “Rational Animals.”)
3. Drawing on “A Nice Derangement of
Epitaphs” and “Knowing One’s Own Mind,” explain what Davidson might say about
Burge’s “arthritis” thought experiment (in “Individualism and the Mental”). What do you think is the main point of
contention between Davidson and Burge?
Who do you think is right, and why?
An
even newer handout on Davidson is now on the web (this time on his anomalous
monism).
Alas,
the next Wednesday section (
Tuesday
Tuesday
Sorry.
A new
handout on Davidson is now on the web.
April
9, 2003
IMPORTANT:
If
you have a question about the grade you got for the paper or for the study
questions, don't hesitate to contact me. I am very happy to give you a better
grade if you convince me that your paper/SQ deserves a better grade.
The
way to do it is to send me an email with your reasons why your paper/SQ deserves
a better grade. An important constraint based on my painful past experiences: I
will only consider your email if you send it more than 48 hours after you got
your paper/SQ back (to filter out emotional reactions).
March
20, 2003
A
couple of things before the spring break breaks out.
1.
The next
installment of study questions is due on the 3rd of April (not on the
1st)
2.
If you have
not picked up your previous study questions yet, you can do so after the break.
3.
If you have
not submitted the first paper to me today at class, please put it into my
mailbox. I don't know whether Moses Hall will be open during the break, so I
encourage you to put it there by Friday the 21st.
4.
I will be
absolutely away from my mail during the break. Sorry about this, but if you have
any questions, I can answer them on the 31st.
5.
Have fun and
see you in April.
March
10, 2003
I
posted some supposedly useful guidelines for writing philosophy papers (a
courtesy of the philosophy head GSI, Diana Fleming). See
above.
March
7, 2003
Here
are the paper topics for the first paper (in case you lost your copy of it or
something):
1.
On Grice’s and Searle’s
accounts of speaker’s meaning, what a speaker means by an utterance depends
entirely on his or her intentions in making it. But it seems that what we
can mean by an utterance is affected by the availability of conventional
resources (like a common language). It seems that we can mean more when
we have the use of a common language than when we are in a foreign country where
we don’t speak the language. How can this be, if speaker’s meaning is determined
entirely by the speaker’s intentions?
2.
Explain and critically
evaluate the "Systems Reply" to Searle’s Chinese Room argument. In setting out
the Systems Reply, try to make it as plausible and compelling as possible. The
evaluative part of your paper can either defend or criticize the Systems Reply.
In either case, you should take account of Searle’s response to it in "Minds,
Brains, and Programs."
3.
How would Searle and
Dennett, respectively, approach the question "Do birds have beliefs?" What kinds
of considerations would each appeal to in trying to answer it? Which approach do
you favor, and why?
4.
Consider the following
argument:
Sara and Lara are
molecule-for-molecule duplicates. Each says to herself, "I am tired." Sara’s
word "I" refers to Sara, while Lara’s word "I" refers to Lara. But their
psychological states are the same (they are, after all, molecule-for-molecule
duplicates). Thus one’s psychological state doesn’t determine what one’s words
are referring to.
Does Putnam’s Twin
Earth thought experiment establish anything that this simpler argument does not?
If so, what more does it show? If not, why does its conclusion seem surprising
or counterintuitive? Discuss.
5.
Everyone would agree
that Bertrand, the protagonist in Burge’s thought experiment, is getting
something wrong. Burge thinks his mistake concerns arthritis: Bertrand
believes (falsely) that he has arthritis in his thigh. An alternative
interpretation is that Bertrand’s mistake concerns language: Bertrand does not
believe that he has arthritis in his thigh, but rather that ‘arthritis’ in
English is the name for the disease he has in his thigh. What can be said for
and against each of these interpretations of the thought experiment? Which
interpretation do you think is correct, and why? (Be sure to take into account
what Burge says in section III of his paper.)
February 19,
2003
The
third handout is on the web, this time on Searle's Chinese room and the system
reply (see above)
February 17,
2003
Study
questions deadline: the 25th of February at class.
However, if
you put the study questions into my mailbox in 301 Moses Hall by 6pm Friday the
28th, I'll still accept them.
February 12,
2003
The
first handout is here, check it out. (see above)
Some of you indicated
that you had problems understanding the difference between necessary and
sufficient conditions, so here is a short summary:
Let's take the claim
if A then B
In this case, A is the
sufficient condition of B and B is the necessary condition of A.
So if all humans are
mammals, then being a mammal is a necessary condition for being human, and being
a human is a sufficient condition for being a mammal.
If x is human, then x
is mammal, but not vice versa.
I
finally have the rooms for the sections assigned. Here they are:
Tuesday
Tuesday
Wednesday
Office hours
this week: see above. They'll change almost every week so that those who cannot
make it this week could come too.
My office hours for Thursday
will take place from